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The parties generally agree on the facts and procedural history of the case. The 
parties have phrased the issues on appeal differently, which differences appear to drive the 
structure and arguments of the briefing. Appellant phrases the issue as whether the district 
court erred in finding no legal cause to believe that Respondent Feasel was under the 
influence of drugs or other intoxicating substances. 
Respondent phrases the issues on appeal as whether LC. § 18-8002A holds drug tests 
to a different, causation based adjudicative standard than drug tests and whether the district 
court properly concluded there was no causal connection between the drug test results and a 
violation ofI.C. § 18-8004(1)(a). Therefore, Respondent's brief does not directly follow the 
form or analysis offered by Appellant. This reply brief is limited to addressing those issues 
raised by Respondent's brief. 
Il. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Reisenauer case, to the extent relevant, supports Appellant's position. 
Respondent asserts that the scope of the Court's prior holding in Reisenauer v. State 
Department a/Transportation, 145 Idaho 948, 188 P.3d 890 (2008) is essential to the present 
case. In fact, the Reisenauer case held that the state must prove the substance is a drug in an 
ALS hearing. Appellant has satisfied the requirement in Reisenauer. The question becomes 
what is the level of proof needed to establish that the drug was intoxicating as to the driver. 
The Idaho Supreme Court noted in Reisenauer "the State's test need only demonstrate 
the mere presence of drugs," not the amount of drugs. Id. at 951, 188 P.3d at 893. The Court 
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held that the drug must be intoxicating. The Court did not establish criteria for determining 
whether a drug was intoxicating. In the present case, the Hearing Officer determined that 
Respondent Feasel's significant impairments and failure of field sobriety tests provided 
evidence supporting a conclusion that the drugs were intoxicating as to this driver. 
Respondent Feasel contends that, even with evidence of a drug and indicia of 
impairment, without testimony or scientific proof of the causal link between the drug and the 
impairment the Department can not suspend an individual's drivers license. Respondent 
Feasel states "[h]ad the examiner found some causal connection between the 'failed' drug 
test, or the drug Prozac itself and the driver's impairment, this case might be distinguishable 
from Reisenauer." (Respondent's Brief, pg. 7). The Hearing Officer did not specifically say 
that the drug caused the impairments. The Hearing Officer did state, however the peace 
officer had legal cause to believe a violation had occurred "because of an admission by the 
driver of taking prescription medications, slurred speech, impaired memory, [and] failure of 
field sobriety tests." (AR 028). The Hearing Officer further noted "a violation for drugs 
requires a determination of the presence of drugs, combined with indications of impairment." 
(AR 029). The Hearing Officer found indications of impairment. 
It is unclear from the Reisenauer decision the extent to which the cases are factually 
similar. The Reisenauer case limited its discussion of the driver's impairments to the 
following: 
On February 26, 2006, Kyle J. Reisenauer drove to the 6th and 
Main intersection in Moscow. Officer Dustin Blaker pulled over 
Reisenauer and observed that Reisenauer's eyes were red and that his 
vehicle emitted "the odor of burnt marijuana." Officer Blaker then 
instructed Reisenauer to perform several field sobriety evaluations and 
Reisenauer subsequently was arrested for driving under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs and transported to the Latah County Jail. At the jail, 
Officer Rodney Wolverton performed a Drug Recognition Evaluation on 
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Reisenauer and concluded that Reisenauer was not safe to drive, as he was 
under the influence of cannabis and depressants. 
Id at 949, 188 P.3d at 891. 
With this discussion, the Reisenauer court noted: 
Neither party contests that there existed legal cause to stop 
Reisenauer, nor does anyone contend that Officer Blaker lacked legal 
cause to believe that Reisenauer was driving under the influence of 
alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of the law. The 
only issue, therefore, is whether the test results showed the presence of 
drugs or other intoxicating substances. 
Id at 950, 188 P.3d at 892. 
In the present case, given the rearend collision, slurred speech, and failure of multiple 
field sobriety tests, there was legal cause to stop the vehicle and to believe Respondent Feasel 
was under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicating substances. The tests did 
show the presence of the drug Prozac. Further, Respondent Feasel conceded he had ingested 
three (3) other drugs. The drug(s) were intoxicating as to Respondent Feasel. Therefore, 
under the basic reading of Reisenauer, the suspension should be upheld 
Respondent Feasel attempts to differentiate between the stage of an ALS proceeding 
where a probable cause affidavit and automatic suspension issue and the adjudicative phase. 
Respondent Feasel contends that only when a driver challenges a suspension must the 
Department prove the drug caused the noted impairments. This argument is counter to the 
clear statutory provisions that a hearing officer can rely upon the officer's sworn statement 
and a test result, with the driver bearing the burden of establishing the suspension should be 
reversed. 
Respondent Feasel's interpretation of the statute would effectively render it virtually 
impossible for the Appellant to suspend a license based on drugs or other intoxicating 
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substances. Rather than relying on a sworn statement of intoxication and the presence of 
drugs on a test, the Appellant would be required to obtain the testimony of a toxicologist 
before a license could even be suspended. This rewriting of the statute is clearly in 
contravention of the legislature's intent and such an interpretation would lead to absurd 
results. 
Respondent Feasel further contends that the Appellant's view of the statute would 
lead to suspensions in cases where the test showed the presence of children's Tylenol, 
caffeine or ibuprofen, an antidepressent, or herbal remedies such as Echinacea. Respondent 
Feasel's argument fails to consider the component of the officer's sworn statement and field 
sobriety tests. If, for instance, an antidepressant is consumed which results in a driver's 
inability to safely travel the roads because the antidepressant is intoxicating as to that 
particular driver a license suspension should follow. In the present case, Respondent Feasel 
consumed four ( 4) different drugs and, although he testified they had not affected him in the 
past, it was clear they affected him on the date and time in question. At its core, the statute is 
intended to address safety, which safety is compromised when intoxicated individuals drive. 
Respondent Feasel was intoxicated. The Reisenauer case supports Appellant's argument that 
field sobriety tests and an officer's sworn statement can be used to establish the intoxicating 
effects a drug has on a driver, as was done in the present case. 
B. The term "competent evidence" is not vague and is not relevant to the 
analysis. 
At an administrative license suspension ("ALS") hearing, the results of any tests for 
the presence of drugs shall be admissible, as is the sworn statement of the arresting officer 
and the accompanying documents. The burden of proof is on the party challenging the 
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license suspension. Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7). ALS appeals are governed by the Idaho 
Rules of Administrative Procedure of the Attorney General. IDAPA 39.02.72.003. 
The rules of evidence as described by Attorney General Rule 600 are as follows: 
Evidence should be taken by the agency to assist the parties' development of 
the record, not excluded to frustrate that development. The presiding officer at 
hearing is not bound by the Idaho Rules of Evidence. No informality in any 
proceeding or in the manner of taking testimony invalidates any order. The 
presiding officer, with or without objection, may exclude evidence that is 
irrelevant, unduly repetitious, inadmissible on constitutional or statutory 
grounds, or on the basis of any evidentiary privilege provided by statute or 
recognized in the courts of Idaho. All other evidence may be admitted if it is 
of a type commonly relied upon by prudent persons in the conduct of their 
affairs. The agency's experience, technical competence and specialized 
knowledge may be used in evaluation of evidence. 
IDAPA 04.11.01.600. 
Respondent Feasel asserts that the term "competent evidence" of drug use contained 
in Idaho Code § 18-8004(3) is unconstitutionally vague. Respondent respectfully submits 
that the aforementioned subsection is not relevant to the analysis. This is so because on its 
face the subsection deals with how drug use can be considered when a person's alcohol 
concentration is less that 0.08 "in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant." In 
contrast, the ALS does not concern itself with the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
Rather, when a peace officer signs a sworn statement that there is legal cause to believe a 
person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of drugs, the Department shall suspend the person's driver's license, which only 
may be vacated upon a demonstration that the peace officer did not have legal cause to stop 
the person, that the officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been driving 
while under the influence of drugs, that the testing was faulty or that the person was not 
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informed of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary testing. Idaho Code § 18-
8002A(7) 
This statute has explicitly been found to be remedial in nature and not punitive. State 
v. Reichenberg, 128 Idaho 452, 915 P.2d 14 (1996). Hence, the portion ofidaho Code§ 18-
8004 dealing with competent evidence to find guilt or innocence has no application. 
In any event, the term "competent evidence" is not unduly vague. The Idaho courts 
on numerous occasions have held that substantial and competent evidence is relevant 
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Jarvis v. Rexburg 
Nursing Center, 136 Idaho 579, 38 P.3d 617 (2001); Curtis v. M H. King Company, 142 
Idaho 383, 128 P.3d 920 (2005); Stolle v. Bennett, 145 Idaho 44, 156 P.3d 545 (2007). As 
can be seen, the definition of substantial and competent evidence is virtually identical to that 
standard of evidence used in administrative hearings as set forth in the Attorney General 
Rules. 
Respondent Feasel argues that evidence of drugs in one's system should not be 
admitted by the hearing officer absent some demonstration of causation. Otherwise, the 
argument goes, a person taking a simple pain killer could be prosecuted under the statute. It 
is submitted that it is not possible to read the statute outlawing driving under the influence in 
the way Respondent Feasel suggests. In order to be guilty of the crime of driving under the 
influence, a person must have drugs in his system, must be driving and, most important, must 
be "under the influence" of the drug. Idaho Code § 18-8004(l)(a). The tenn "under the 
influence" means impairment of physical or mental function that relates to one's ability to 
drive. This may be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence. State v. Bronnenberg, 124 
Idaho 67, 856 P.2d 104 (1993). No specific degree or state of intoxication is required, but 
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only a showing that enough of the substance has been ingested as to influence or affect the 
ability to drive. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 844 P.2d 691 (1992). Impairment may be 
demonstrated by observation of some type of ascertainable conduct or effect. State v. 
Andrus, 118 Idaho 711, 800 P .2d 107 (I 990). Given the relaxed level of evidence that the 
hearing officer may consider under the rules, it is clear that the hearing officer may take 
scientific evidence of the presence of a drug into consideration when accompanied by 
evidence of impairment. That is certainly the case here. 
In this matter, Respondent Feasel admitted to ingesting four (4) different drugs, any 
one of which could reasonably be seen to have affected his driving. As a review of the tape 
of the conversations with Respondent Feasel will demonstrate, Respondent was nodding off 
while behind the wheel while the first officer on the scene was speaking to him. Although 
the tape is painfully unclear in sections, there is enough on the tape to demonstrate that 
Respondent Feasel was in almost a trance-like state and that he claimed that he had used 
Ambien approximately eight (8) or nine (9) hours before for the first time. Ambien, as is 
well known, is a sleep agent. Given the failure of several field sobriety tests, not to mention 
the rearend collision, causation cannot be seriously challenged. 
C. The Hearing Officer properly considered evidence in determining 
Respondent Feasel was under the influence of a drug or other 
intoxicating substance. 
Respondent Feasel contends the hearing officer ignored the most probative evidence 
and relied on the least probative evidence in upholding the license suspension. Respondent 
Feasel states a review of the tapes establishes there was no discussion of Prozac and no 
admission of impairments made by Respondent Feasel. However, the agency's findings, 
inferences, conclusions or decisions need only be supported by substantial evidence in the 
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record as a whole. See I.C. § 67-5279(3). Although Respondent Feasel may disagree with 
the amount of weight afforded evidence by the hearing officer, there was substantial evidence 
to support the conclusions reached by the hearing officer. 
Respondent Feasel also asserts that there must be a causation component to the drug 
testing. Without this, it is asserted, the test is nothing more that junk science. Respondent 
Feasel essentially argues that, once a toxicologist testified that the presence of Prozac in a 
person's system alone would not prove intoxication and that a urine test can not be "failed," 
the hearing officer should have vacated the suspension. The hearing officer did not find that 
Petitioner "failed" a drug test. Rather, it was found that there were numerous indications that 
the driver was impaired. Further, Respondent Feasel specifically admitted under oath the 
ingestion of several drugs. 1 
As previously discussed, Respondent Feasel admitted to ingesting lithium. The Idaho 
Court of Appeals has previously held that lithium is a "drug" for the purpose of the statute 
prohibiting driving under the influence ofan intoxicant. State v. Goerig, 121 ldaho 108,822 
P.2d 1005 (Ct. App. 1991). In the present case, the drug(s) taken by Respondent Feasel 
were intoxicating as to him, as established by the traffic accident, observations of the officer, 
and the results of the field sobriety test. 
1 The fact that the laboratory test only referred to Prozac is not particularly relevant in this case. It is unknown 
whether Wellbutrin, Ambien or Lithium were even searched for in the testing, and it is unknown whether the 
Wellbutrin, Lithium or Ambien had time to metabolize to the point where it could be found in the Petitioner's 




For these reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the decision of the district court 
dismissing the Department's suspension of Mr. Feasel's driver's license should be reversed. 
Dated this 2ot11 day of May, 2009. 
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
BY:~~ 
MICHAEL.I. KANE 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 201h day of May, 2009, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below and addressed to 
the following: 
Mr. Robert A. Wallace 
Attorney at Law 
290 Bobwhite Court, Suite 260 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
[Facsimile: 343-2069] 
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